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Introduction
Hyo Yoon Kang and Sara Kendall
Over the last decade there has been an increased interest in materiality
within legal scholarship, as well as in related disciplines that study
law and its practices. Much of it has accounted for the concrete
and complex manifestations of law through various materials: from
formats of inscription to other mediated devices, such as files and
images, to bodies and spaces upon and through which law acts. Yet the
terms ‘matter’, ‘materials’ and ‘materiality’ are employed in divergent
ways across different works, and often without clear distinctions or
theoretical delineations.1 This special issue begins from proposing
a differentiated understanding of these terms in relation to law and
legal scholarship, and embeds them in a broader conception of legality,
unpacking their premises and implications.
After developing the working definitions of matters, materials and
legal materiality outlined below, we invited contributors from a range of
disciplines – including law, anthropology, philosophy, political theory
and literature – to critically engage through matters or materials that
they have chosen. The following collection of articles, essays and a poem
is an experimental and open-ended form of production, illustrating the
benefits and challenges of legal materiality as a mode of inquiry. As
these contributions show, the working definitions of these terms are
not always easy to separate and sometimes recalcitrantly collapse into
each other. Yet distinguishing between matters (problematisations)
and materials (their constitutive parts) helps to illuminate law's actual
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workings by identifying and analyzing the composition and forms that
enact legality, instead of confining critique to a general level which
leaves 'law' intact as an abstract black box.
1 Why materiality?
Other disciplines have undergone ‘material turns’ to the point that
works employing a materialist approach are included in the canons
of their disciplines. The ‘materials’ in such turns in other disciplines,
as in anthropology, history of science or political theory, are particular
practices and claims, artefacts, organisms and physical settings, distinct
from broad categories such as ‘culture’, ‘society’, ‘science’ or ‘politics’.2
Inspirations for such a turn in law are diverse, but much is owed to
Cornelia Vismann’s pioneering work at the intersection of legal history
and media studies (2001, 2008, 2011, 2012), which considered the
legality of concrete media, such as files or films, rather than categorical
accounts of legal doctrinal forms. In Anglophone legal scholarship,
theoretical discussions of what materiality may mean in relation to
law have been offered by scholars building upon the work of Foucault,
Latour, Vismann (Pottage 2012) and Benjamin (Tomlins 2010).3 We
have traced the different strands of materiality and notions of legal
materiality elsewhere (Kang 2018; Kang and Kendall 2019); here we
illustrate what a focus on materiality could offer.
We understand the turn to materials as a reaction and a possible
way out of the postmodern conundrum of the self-referentiality of
social and historicist critique. God is dead, but it would seem so
is society. If there is nothing outside the social, which means that
law forms part of the very thing by which it is often explained, any
explanations of the ‘legal’ by reference to the ‘social’ or ‘political’ result
in dedifferentiation (Schlag 2009). The risk of abstract explanations in
legal scholarship – for example, explaining the ‘legal’ by reference to
the ‘social’ or ‘economic’ — is that they flatten the explanatory field,
as with the economic determinism of orthodox Marxist historical
materialism or the political determinism of Critical Legal Studies.
Biopolitics, markets, and racism cannot be explained by reference to
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other abstract categories, such as power, because they already form part
of these categories. Explaining neoliberalism through capital, or politics
through power, or indeed law through politics does not contribute much
to an understanding of what these labels themselves consist of, how they
come about, and the concrete practices that they entail. Legal concepts
such as property or jurisdiction cannot be explained by references to
sovereignty or territory. These abstract categories can be rendered
more concrete and their compositions can be unpacked to open them
to greater critical potential. A legal materialist approach reintroduces
differentiation into legal analysis by focusing on the artefacts, practices,
formats and settings in and through which law acts and is enacted. A
legal materialist approach turns from knowledge of legal concepts (as
with the doctrinal study of law) to legal ways of knowing and to the
materials that law draws upon.
Approaching law in a materialist way calls for reflecting upon the
ways in which we can identify the constitutive parts of a legal concept by
situating our own viewpoint. It then involves analysis and interpretive
reconstruction, followed by a critical assessment of the resulting picture
of, for example, jurisdiction as a ‘whole’ whilst taking into account
the unstable composition of the parts.4 Assuming a deconstructivist
ontology and an inductive epistemology, the legal materialist approach
proposes to look at the concrete composition of abstract legal categories,
such as evidence, honor or human rights. Rather than assuming an
overarching or unifying theory of ‘Law’ or legality, this approach offers
a reconstruction of how specific legal issues are stabilised in the absence
of such an outside referent. Through attending to the composition of
specific assemblages, and the techniques and relations they entail, a
legal materialist approach has the potential to generate more clarity
for understanding what counts as legal knowledge and how legality
materializes.

The meanings and uses of materiality in legal scholarship have
been varied and based on divergent understandings of matter and
materials. For example, some strands of legal scholarship understand
materiality to denote physical objects or artefacts to be taken as symbols
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or allegories of law, an approach that reads law into objects (Hohmann
and Joyce 2018). Other scholars of law work with new materialist
theories, such as insights from the cognitive sciences concerning
embodied and distributed minds, as well as socialized bodies (Miller
2013). The material turn in legal scholarship has been more pronounced
in some legal subfields than in others. This has particularly been
the case in subfields that take up challenges to or the breakdown of
existing legal concepts. For example, biotechnological entities pose
challenges to legal conceptions of personhood and invention, and
the proliferation of digital data contests conceptions of privacy and
jurisdiction. In these cases the scholar faces two distinct materialities:
not only the materiality of the novel thing, but also the materiality of
legal categories that depend upon techniques of legal representation.
Other legal scholars have traced how law shapes physical matters
and their meanings, such as plants, rather than arguing that physical
materials determine law (Sherman 2008). Scholars in other disciplines,
particularly anthropology, sociology, science and technology studies
(STS), and media studies, have also studied law as (partially) materially
mediated constructions (Scheffer 2004, Biagioli 2006, Krajewski &
Vismann 2007, Leach 2008, Strathern 2010, Lezaun 2012).
2 Conceptualising legal materiality
Building upon previous work on materiality in law and legal scholarship,
we introduce a specific understanding of legal materiality that denotes
the process or composition by which matters turn into legal concerns
or problematisations through materials, such as texts, forms, formats,
techniques, and physical as well as immaterial entities. This approach
seeks to understand how different materials articulate and shape legal
difference. Yet the terms ‘material’ and ‘matter are often misunderstood
as physical ‘things’. By contrast, we propose an understanding of these
terms that moves beyond instrumentalising objects as symbols or tools
of and for law, and also beyond ascribing causal agency to objects and
things without attending to their specific enlisting within law as well
as their histories outside the legal realm (Kang 2018). We contend
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that some of these approaches take a reductive view of law, treating
it as a black box or reading it into objects without accounting for the
ways in which law is a specific mode of knowledge that transforms
certain objects into legal materials in order to deliberate over ‘matters
of concern’ to law.5 Moreover, some of the legal transpositions of actor
network theory and new materialism also adopt a reductive view of
matters and materials as self-evident and self-explanatory without
accounting for the complex processes, particular knowledge practices
and techniques which make them appear (for example, with image and
sound). Our proposed approach takes care not to collapse into either a
materialist determinism or a hermeneutic self-referentiality, and a legal
materialist mode of inquiry would mediate between these two poles.

In thinking through what is specific about legal materiality – as
opposed to physical materiality or other kinds of materialities – we
have needed to address the question of legal ontology. Some of our
interlocutors have explicitly grappled with the question ‘what is law?’,
such as Marianne Constable in relation to legal speech (2014) and
Alain Pottage asking about law as the unknown of ‘the materiality of
what?’ (2012). Our approach takes their work as departure points and
extends them into an understanding of legal materiality, an approach
which makes a theoretical argument defining a specific notion of legal
materiality as well as offering an analytical perspective that shows
the constitution of matters of concern and the role of materials in
law. Legal materiality as a mode of analysis does not offer a unifying
theory of legal causality or meaning, but instead serves as a mode of
tracing and differentiating between the fluctuating elements, internal
structures and compositional arrangement of a particular matter of
law. Legal materiality is therefore concerned with the concrete steps
of how something comes to matter (in the sense of a verb) rather than
in the sense of a physical object.
We propose some working definitions of matter, materials and
materiality specifically in relation to law. As with Scheffer and
Pottage, who draw on Foucault, we understand ‘law’ not as a material
phenomenon, but rather as the difference attributed to a legal matter or
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problem as distinctly legal. This difference is generated in the moment of
attributing a legal quality to a matter. Legal difference, or the attribution
of ‘legal’, is the mode of veridiction specific to law. This builds upon
Foucault’s general conception of énoncé, a discursive form that is often
translated as ‘statement’ or ‘utterance’ (1972).6 Latour also builds upon
this particular understanding of law as an autonomous mode of distinct
enunciations, a singular ‘mode of existence’. He contends that law is
‘recognized as a domain that can be isolated from the rest… it has its
own mode of veridiction… universally acknowledged as capable of
distinguishing truth from falsity in its own way’ (2013: 358-9). Legal
meaning is a distinct socially constructed attribution of meaning that
draws and enacts a difference between the legal and the non-legal.
‘Law’ does not exist prior to or outside such an act of differentiation.

Law’s distinctness then arises by differentiating matters into ‘legal
matters’. The attribution of a distinct ‘legal’ difference is a linguistic
or – if outside human language, other communicative7 – act of
interpretation, which turns matters into arguments or claims. Despite
their physical presence, things may not matter as ‘legal matters’ or
may not be perceived as relevant for law, and they may only become
legal matters under distinct conditions and material mediations. If a
matter is transformed into a legal matter (through the attribution of
legal difference), then it becomes a matter of concern to law. In order
for a matter to be legally relevant, there has to be a legally recognizable
problem; in other words, it has to have a legal context so that it can
be perceived and expressed in legal language. Legal matters are
therefore problematisations in Foucault’s sense: ‘the set of discursive or
nondiscursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the
true and false, and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether under
the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis,
etc.)’ (1988: 157). Latour’s ‘regime of enunciation’, Vismann’s ‘cultural
techniques of distinction’ or Luhmann’s idea of coded communication
are similar to Foucault’s notion of problematisation, although these
theorists differ in their understanding of the referent(s) of the legal
mode of veridiction. A legal materialist study would need to consider the
distinct conditions under which law recognizes and represents matters
6
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of concern – legal matters – and the distinct mode in which it mobilizes
materials. How do certain (social, economic, cultural, environmental)
matters become legal matters? Legal materials mediate and transform
matters into distinctly legal matters. For example, manuals and
restatements of law are legal materials, whereas jurisdictional claims
are a legal matter of concern. Without legal materials, matters are not
intelligible to law.
Legal materials materialize legal difference, but they are distinct
from legal matters. Whereas legal matters are not physical but are
rather conceptual, legal materials may be physical or intangible. Legal
materials’ defining features are that they are constitutive and functional;
they are materials for the making of legal meaning. Legal materials
include techniques (different forms and genres), modes of representation
(different media, textual and non-textual), bureaucratic arrangements,
and physical spaces in which legal matters are discussed. Materials are
only legal materials insofar as they contribute to the making of legal
meaning, such as a the qualified space of a courtroom; but they also
may have purposes outside of the distinct regime of enunciation that
is law; for example, when the courtroom is used in other functions or
transformed into a residential building. Legal materials can be dormant
(closed criminal case files in archives, abandoned and discarded patent
applications), but they can also be active (texts of rulings, rules for
statutory interpretation, drafting techniques, mapped borders, animals,
humans, mediums of evidence). Legal materials do not always matter
(in the sense of a verb). For example, a notebook might be kept by a
researcher for her own records, but it becomes a legal material if she has
to claim priority for the novelty of an invention in patent law. A legal
materialist approach makes visible the materials through which law
operates and shows how they are enlisted in the production of legality.

For Foucault and Luhmann, however, materials do not determine or
‘make’ law; causation works the other way around, as the legal énoncé
turns certain things into legal materials. The legal énoncé is performed
and enacted in a Foucaultian dispositif consisting of materials.8 Perhaps
more materialist than Latour, Foucault and Luhmann, Cornelia
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Vismann conceived and studied materials as law’s constitutive media
that inform the ways in which a legal matter is revealed. We believe
that the turn to materials is particularly useful if the legal matter itself
is hard to figure, especially when it seems even more immaterial than
other matters, as with intellectual property or jurisdiction. If there is
no established legal matter or it is in the process of emerging, a legal
materialist mode of inquiry looks for the materials that make up the
‘law’; that is, the means by which legal difference is produced.

Lastly, we distinguish legal matters from law’s objects or legal
objects, where the nature of legality is taken as given. In some scholarly
approaches it would appear that potentially anything can be read as a
legal object, but its manner of legal materialization and qualification –
how legal difference manifests – is rarely considered. We contend that
objects are only legal matters of concern as far as they are taken as or
mediated by legal materials. We do not assume that tactile things and
artefacts are self-evident to law simply because they physically exist.
Their physicality would need to be translated into a legal context in
order to be perceived as a legal material, and they only become material
to law under distinct conditions. Matters of law are not tactile or
physical, but rather issues, problematisations or concerns. For example,
a matter of law is not land, but rather territory, jurisdiction, property
or sovereignty. A piece of music itself is not a matter of concern to
law, but it becomes one if it gets implicated in questions of authorship,
copyright or access. A legal material may be a physical object, such as
a book, but also may be an oral testimony or a technique, such as rules
of procedure. Building upon these distinctions between legal matters
and legal materials, we propose an understanding of law as a distinct
mode of producing matters of concern through enlisting materials,
whether physical or intangible.
3 Thinking through law’s matters and materials
This special issue began from an experimental approach, and
contributors’ engagements ranged from building upon the project’s
points of departure to offering different ways of thinking through
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legal materiality. Their articles and essays take up a diverse set of
matters, from overtly legal examples – as with evidence, title, justice,
and distinction – to considerations of knowledge, hope, and honor
as they relate to legal forms. The materials under consideration are
equally diverse, drawing on texts such as novels, source code, statutory
language, a case concerning jars of jam, early international law treatises,
prefaces, and postcards (literal and metaphorical), as well as practices
such as expert testimony, oral history, duels, military targeting, and
even changes of heart. Not all contributors shared our terminology
and premises, and some contributions reveal what eludes or unsettles
law and its juridical forms.
For example, in James Leach’s opening account, ‘Documents against
“Knowledge”’, he warns against treating law as a transcendent form,
‘a “reality” that is inscribed in, makes use of, and appears through
materials’. Law exists within practices, Leach contends, and some of
these practices may in fact subvert a transcendent vision of law’s authority
and authoritativeness, as when people of the Rai Coast of Papua New
Guinea ‘do’ knowledge through the production of documents that are
not bound to a transcendent conception of what lies outside the activity
of their making. What Pierre Legendre has described elsewhere as
‘legal delineation’ and ‘the juridical space of structure’ that transmits
content and power over time actually presumes an occidental approach
to knowledge, a knowledge that is inhabited through texts and tied to
authoritative forms (Legendre 1997: 71). Leach unsettles such framings
by showing how they presuppose a transcendent form of knowledge
inscribed in law through various (textual) materials, but that there
are other cosmologies that bear ‘attributes’ of legality. Jill Stauffer’s
contribution also reveals the cultural particularity of western legal
forms by examining the encounter between a Canadian jurisdiction
and indigenous claims to title based on songs, stories, and objects,
arguing that what constitutes ‘legal’ materials should be expanded to
avoid reinscribing colonial relations within and through law. These
two opening pieces illustrate the importance of materials in thinking
through what constitutes legality, and they raise the ethical question
of how to avoid the imposition of dominant legal cosmologies through
9
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accepted ‘legal’ materials.

Wouter Werner’s contribution takes up a legal material by turning
to what Gerard Genette calls ‘paratextual elements’, focusing on the
role of the preface in international law. If the first two contributions
attempt to unsettle the givenness of what is considered ‘legal’ in the
first place, revealing its colonial presumptions, Werner approaches
the question of how legal authority is produced from within textual
practices. As mediations between text and context, prefaces situate
what follows within a tradition and may in fact produce and shore up
the structure of authorship, as with the example of Vitoria’s De Indis,
a central text in the historical emergence of the discipline. An excerpt
from Fabian Steinhauer’s work follows as a bridge between these first
three accounts of the legality at stake within legal materiality, and
advances ‘cultural techniques of law’ as an approach between law,
media studies, and cultural studies. Steinhauer contends that such an
approach should be ‘parajuridical’, moving beyond law’s medium of
language and attending to the ways in which law attempts (and fails)
to differentiate itself from what it posits as its outside.
Following Steinhauer’s call to explore these cultural techniques,
Kamari Clarke and Sara Kendall’s contribution considers the
incorporation of geospatial technologies as legal materials in
international criminal tribunals, focusing on the matter of evidence as
a highly regulated field of practice. Through focusing on expert witness
testimony before the International Criminal Court, they offer an
account of ‘juridical mediation’ that illustrates how satellite images and
practices of expert reading are conscripted into legal processes that ‘see’
things otherwise. Markus Krajewski explores the juridical character of
algorithms as a precedential mode of reasoning, contending that they
foster a kind of closure or codification as legal materials. Against this
view of algorithmic opaqueness, he advances the idea of ‘source code
critique’ that would examine the ‘interplay of code and commentary’,
rendering algorithms more transparent through practices of reading
and commentary that are familiar within the legal field, where codes (of
law) have been compiled through accumulated commentaries over time.
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An excerpt from Tung-Hui Hu’s poem Punishment: An Index
recounts the various ways that humans have sought to attribute
responsibility to inanimate objects, flogging and banishing bells,
placing ‘homicidal objects’ on trial, and impounding cars for their
complicity in moral failures. Hyo Yoon Kang takes up the broader
problem of materializing abstract matters in her contribution on
‘climate justice’, where attempts to litigate climate change as human
rights violations run up against the limits posed by differing scales
of knowledge and legal formats. Kang employs a legal materialist
approach of seeing the legal enactment of ‘climate justice’ through the
elements that comprise it. Matei Candea’s contribution considers the
matter of honour, ‘a recalcitrant matter of law’, which he claims comes to
matter for French law through the transformation of the duel – and its
material traces of violence and bodily harm – into libel. The emergence
of late nineteenth century libel law – still in use today – serves as the
textual location of honour, more accurately viewed as the extension
of the duel’s concern with its violation rather than a formalisation
of a social code concerned with truth. Stuart Murray’s intervention
explores how life appears as a matter for law, arguing that both life
and law are ‘technological artefacts of biopolitical power’ that exceed
what a legal materialist approach can address. Through a reading of
Milan Kundera’s novel The Joke and the production of hope within the
fertility industry, Murray argues that the ‘immaterial’ rhetorical force
of language and speculative futures determine law, which he conceives
as a sovereign-juridical tool of ‘biopower’.
Mahmoud Keshavarz and Amin Parsa show how materials
imbued with legal meanings are consequential by considering the role
of military uniforms in establishing the principle of distinction as a
matter of concern to (international) law. Their contribution illustrates
how the law of armed conflict establishes a domain of persuasion in
which signs and markers used on the battlefield enables the distinction
between civilian and military targets. The matter of legitimate
targeting is rendered intelligible through the material of the uniform,
which is troubled by the absence of such insignia in contemporary
asymmetric warfare. James Martel’s contribution focuses on law’s
11
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fraught entanglements with objects by reading Franz Kafka’s The Trial
together with a US supreme court case. Following Walter Benjamin
(and Kafka), Martel shows how law lacks a clear ontological basis for
its authority and must rely upon objects to assert itself; when these
objects prove recalcitrant, as with the case of ‘imitation jam’, law’s
vulnerability and dependence are revealed as a foil to its ‘powerful
desire to be read otherwise’.

The last two contributions consider mediations through which
law is altered, both textually and materially. The collaborative work
between Marie-Andree Jacob and Anna Macdonald brings together
perspectives from legal scholarship and artistic practice to consider
the typographical line of the strikethrough as an embodied force,
a performance of the ‘change of heart’ that the inscription enacts.
Marianne Constable’s account of the bureaucratic and cultural lives of
the paper shredder illustrates its entanglements with law’s matters of
evidence and privacy. Both show how materials such as bodies, texts,
inscription devices and machines move in and out of relations with law
in dynamics that manifest through material traces: the strikethrough
marking a change that lingers, the shredded document as a remainder.
Endnotes

1. Notable exceptions include, in particular, Pierre Legendre, Cornelia
Vismann, Alain Pottage, and Christopher Tomlins, who have
different understandings of materiality, particularly in relation to
the level of analysis at which the notion of materiality would be
employed in legal scholarship (for example, for an analysis of a
contemporary development as it stabilizes into something ‘legal’,
or as a legal historical method of montage).
2. There are too many examples to list, but here we list some which
contain thoughtful discussions and conceptualization of an
interpretive-materialist approach and the rich analysis which such
an approach can yield: in anthropology: Gell 1998, Latour 1979; in
political theory: Mitchell 2013; in history of sciences: Rheinberger
1997, Daston ed 2000.
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3. These have been informed by Cornelia Vismann’s work on law and
media studies and Bruno Latour’s ethnography of Conseil d’Etat
(2010).
4. With the concept of jurisdiction, for example, the observer’s
epistemological task of self-reflection is to trace how the abstract
idea of jurisdiction is brought into being by delineating and
qualifying the relations amongst constitutive parts that comprise it.
5. The phrase is often associated with Latour (2004).
6. Pottage (2012) draws on Thomas Scheffer’s (2004) observation
that the énoncé ‘is material because it affords certain possibilities
of “reinscription and transcription”’ (169).
7. For example, the study of algorithmic governmentality and
regulatory frameworks as a legal matter does not engage with
language expressing law, but rather with other legal materials,
such as numbers and probability calculations. With regard to these
modes of communication, Luhmann’s (1998) understanding of an
ecology of communication in which the ‘code’ of law is one out of
many contingent modes of communications may work as a better
analytical framework.
8. Pottage (2012) follows Foucault’s notion of the dispositif and
proposes a definition of legal materiality as a heterogeneous
dispositif composed of discourses (‘regulatory decisions, laws,
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical,
moral and philantropic arguments’) and other human constructions
(‘institutions, architectural formations’).
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